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Abstract
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is one of the most popular
designs in the field of causal inference in nonexperimental settings. It
is based on the idea that the treatment is (totally or partially) deter-
mined by a threshold point of an observed continuous variable. When
the treatment is just partially determined by that variable, it is usu-
ally defined fuzzy RDD. In this setting, given a certain outcome, the
only effect that one is able to identify is the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) for the subpopulation of the Compliers at the threshold point.
The ATE could be obtained by the ratio between the discontinuity at
the threshold point in the average of the observed outcome divided
by the discontinuity in the treatment probability.
This thesis explores, from a methodological and empirical perspec-
tive, how the change of slope at the threshold point is informative for
the estimate of the parameter of interest. Starting from the changes
of the eligibility criterion for retirement that took place in Italy in
the ’90s we propose an alternative estimator, based on Instrumental
Variables, that is a combination of the discontinuity and the change
of slope.
Furthermore we provide a simulation study to compare the efficiency
of the different estimators. Then we analyze the effects of retirement
on the subjective well–being. Finally we generalize the results using
the Two Sample Instrumental Variable estimator, in order to improve
the efficiency of estimates based on administrative data and to con-
struct delayed outcomes for the same cohorts.

Sommario
Il Regression Discontinuity Design e` una delle piu` diffuse tecniche
nell’ambito dell’inferenza causale nei processi quasi-sperimentali. E`
basata sull’idea che l’esposizione ad un trattamento sia (parzialmente
o totalmente) stabilita da un punto di soglia di una variabile continua
e osservabile. Quando l’esposizione al trattamento e` solo parzialmente
stabilita da questa variabile, si e` solito definirlo fuzzy Regression Dis-
continuity Design. In questo contesto, dato un determinato outcome
di interesse, e` possibile identificare soltanto l’effetto medio del tratta-
mento per la sotto-popolazione dei Compliers. Tale effetto puo` essere
ottenuto dal rapporto tra la discontinuita` nel punto di soglia nella
media dell’outcome divisa per la discontinuita` nella probabilita` di es-
posizione al trattamento.
La tesi esamina, da un punto di vista metodologico e empirico, come
possano essere informativi per la stima del parametro di interesse i
cambiamenti di pendenza nel punto di soglia. Partendo dalle modi-
fiche nei criteri di ammissibilita` al pensionamento avvenuti in Italia a
partire dagli anni ’90, abbiamo proposto uno stimatore, basato sulla
logica delle Variabili Strumentali, che e` una combinazione della dis-
continuita` e del cambiamento di pendenza. In seguito abbiamo pro-
posto uno studio di simulazione per confrontare l’efficienza dei diversi
stimatori. Successivamente abbiamo analizzato gli effetti del pension-
amento sulla soddisfazione personale percepita. Infine abbiamo gen-
eralizzato, usando lo stimatore a Variabili Strumentali su Due Cam-
pioni per migliorare l’efficienza delle stime con dati amministrativi o
per costruire outcome successivi al pensionamento.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In the last three decades pension schemes have been often modified due to the
increasing of life expectancy and the population aging. The aim of the changes
is to maintain the financial sustainability of the social security system. The
alternatives considered are typically the reduction of the amount of the pension
or the change in the eligibility rules. Often policy-maker have decided to increase
the requirements in order to preserve a good level of consumption in the older
age (see for example Galasso, 2008).
In Italy the first reform of the pension scheme was put in place in 1992 with the
so called Amato’s law that modifies the eligibility criteria for the retirement age.
This was followed by the Dini’s law in 1995, the Prodi’s law in 1997, the Maroni’s
law in 2004, which all changed the eligibility criteria for the seniority pension.
These laws have brought an increase in the eligibility rules to retirement.
Retirement is a fundamental event in the life-cycle of a person. Many papers
try to investigate the effects of retirement in order to understand which could be
the reaction to an event that increases the leisure time and potentially reduce the
wage of the retirees. Battistin et al. (2009) investigate the effects of retirement
on consumption. Billari and Galasso (2014) analyze the fertility decision of the
couples affected by the reforms and consequently have lower income prospectives.
Many papers try also to investigate the effect of retirement on the subjective well-
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being and depression. Charles (2004) analyze the causal effects of retirement in
US, finding that people that are retired are less depressed and that there is an
improvement in the subjective well-being. Bonsang and Klein (2012) study the
retirement effects in Germany focusing on the differences between voluntary re-
tirements and involuntary retirements (i.e. the person wants to continue working
but is forced to retire). Kim and Moen (2002) underline the contrast between the
so-called short-term “honeymoon” effects (i.e. the person is more happy in the
first period after retirement) and the negative long-term effects in the US. Bertoni
and Brunello (2014), instead, find that in Japan, for a wife the probability to be
depressed increases when the husband retires.
The aim of the thesis is to estimate the effects of retirement on well-being.
The analysis is based on the same logic as in the Regression Discontinuity De-
sign (hereafter RDD), i.e. to identify the causal effects by comparing cohorts
marginally unaffected by the reforms to those marginally affected. RDD, first in-
troduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), has found increasing success in
the late ’90s (see for example Hahn et al., 2001 for the identification assumption
or Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010 for a review and a guide
to practice). The key idea is that the treatment status is (totally or partially)
determined by a threshold point of a continuos observable variable (often defined
assignment, forcing or running variable).
In the recent literature, some papers investigate the treatment effect estimation
using the information given by the change of slope in the treatment probability
or in treatment amount, the so called Regression Kink Design (hereafter RKD).
Some papers use the RKD in order to estimate the effects of a continuos treat-
ment, such as the price sensitivity of demand for prescription drug using the
kinked reimbursement schemes provided by the Danish law (see Simonsen et al.,
2015). Instead Card et al. (2012) investigate the effect of unemployment insur-
ance benefits on the duration of joblessness in Austria, where the benefit schedule
has kinks at the minimum and maximum benefit level. Dong (2014) investigates
the RK estimator in a binary treatment setting (see Rubin, 1974). She shows
that the kink ratio is a combination of the parameter of interest (the average
treatment effect for the compliers at the threshold point, see Angrist et al., 1996
2
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for the definition of compliance in a randomized experiment) and an unobserved
bias term, but she analyzes in detail what could be the best combination between
the standard jump-ratio and the kink-ratio just in the case in which the last one
is not biased.
1.2 Main contributions of the thesis
The main contributions of the thesis are in the following directions:
• Using data from the survey called Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana (Daily
Life Aspects) edited by the Italian National Institute of Statistics we have
estimated the effect on a series of socio-economic outcomes in order to
understand which could be the effects of retirement for the cohorts across
the introduction of the reforms.
• The thesis proposes an alternative estimator based on instrumental variables
that takes into account the information provided by the Jump and the Kink
ratio. The aim is to find a combination of the two ratios that improves the
efficiency of the standard Jump ratio when the Kink ratio is potentially
biased and not only (as in the Dong’s paper) that minimizes the variance.
• We have implemented a simulation study in order to test the performance
of the different estimators.
• We have used administrative data provided by the Italian National Social
Security Institute together with survey data. The two main advantages of
the administrative data is a large sample size and the possibility to observe
the exact moment in which a worker retires. Unfortunately these data do
not provide interesting outcomes, for that reason it was necessary to com-
bine administrative and survey data in order to implement a Two Sample
Instrumental Variable estimator (see Angrist and Krueger, 1992).
• Finally we have used the next waves of the survey data in order to have
delayed outcomes of the same cohorts. Unfortunately the survey does not
3
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provide any repeated measure of the same individuals, so the estimates are
constructed using the same logic of the Two Sample Instrumental Variable.
4
Chapter 2
Pension Reforms and Retirement
Effects
2.1 Literature Review
The increase in life expectancy and the birth reduction have caused, in the sec-
ond part of the XX century, a relevant situation of population ageing. Figure 2.1
summarizes the phenomenon across the European Union. In addition to that,
data suggest an increase in anticipated retirement and consequently a reduction
of the participation at work of elderly people (see for example Costa Dora, 1998).
These two trends have progressively unbalanced the ratio between retired and
working people, compromising the financial sustainability of the social security
system (see Galasso and Profeta, 2004). In general the possible solutions of this
problem could be the increase of the contribution rate for workers, the reduction
of the amount of the pensions and the tightening of the eligibility criterion for
the retirement. The first possibility was hardly ever considered in particular for
inter-generational equity reasons. The second was often avoided in order to pre-
serve a good level of standard of living in older age (see Galasso, 2008).
Therefore policy makers typically have decided to increase the age for retirement.
In Italy the first change was put in place in 1992 with the so called Amato’s law
that modifies the eligibility criteria for the old age pension. This was followed by
5
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the Dini’s law in 1995, the Prodi’s law in 1997, the Maroni’s law in 2004, which
all changed the elegibility criteria for the seniority pension.
The Amato’s law, starting from 1993 to 2001, has brought a progressive increase
in the years of contributions (from 15 to 20 years) and the retirement age (from
60 to 65 years old for men and from 55 to 60 years for women).
The Dini’s law introduced two alternative rules regulating pension eligibility, stat-
ing that this can be obtained either at the age of 57 with 35 years of contributions,
or with 40 years of contributions regardless of the age. As for the Amato’s law,
the introduction of the Dini’s law was gradual, with age and contribution criteria
increasing from 1996 to 2006 and further evolution of the contribution criteria
from 1996 to 2008. The Dini’s law also introduced the so called “contribution
system” for the calculation of the pension amount. For people who started to
work after of the 1st January 1996 the amount of pension is not calculated on
the basis of wages in the last 5 year, but on the basis of the total amount of
contributions paid.
The Prodi’s law in 1997 only anticipated the role out of Dini’s law from 2006 to
2002.
The Maroni’s law in 2004 increased the minimum age for retirement from 57 to
65 for men and 60 for women, but it did not change the 40 years of contribution
condition to obtain pension regardless of age.
A summary of the regulatory changes that characterize these intensive period of
reforms is presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Many papers try to investigate the effects of retirement on consumption. In
the economic theory consumption is supposed to be smooth across life cycle. The
expenditure, seen as a function of age, on consumption is concave and gradually
decreases in the older age, but it is not discontinuous at retirement (see Gour-
inchas and Parker, 2002, for an explanation on the role of precautionary saving
in the older age). However empirical results underline a drop at retirement.
This phenomenon has been called “Retirement Consumption Puzzle”. There are
several explanations of that discontinuity, such as the cessation of work-related
expenses, the inadequate foresee of the decline in income associated with retire-
ment, the increase of the leisure time etc. (see Blau, 2008; Hurd and Rohwedder,
7
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Table 2.1: Old age pension: evolution of eligibility rules
Age Contribution
Period Male Female Year
- 31/12/1992 60 55 15
01/01/1993 - 31/12/1993 60 55 16
01/01/1994 - 31/12/1994 61 56 16
01/01/1995 - 30/06/1995 61 56 17
01/07/1995 - 31/12/1996 62 57 17
01/01/1997 - 30/06/1998 63 58 18
01/07/1998 - 31/12/1998 64 59 18
01/01/1999 - 31/12/1999 64 59 19
01/01/2000 - 31/12/2000 65 60 19
01/01/2001 - 65 60 20
Table 2.2: Seniority pension: evolution of eligibility rules
Age & Only
Period contribution contribution
- 31/12/1995 - 35
01/01/1996 - 31/12/1997 52 & 35 36
01/01/1998 - 31/12/1998 54 & 35 36
01/01/1999 - 31/12/2000 55 & 35 37
01/01/2001 - 31/12/2001 56 & 35 37
01/01/2002 - 31/12/2003 57 & 35 37
01/01/2004 - 31/12/2005 57 & 35 38
01/01/2006 - 31/12/2007 57 & 35 39
01/01/2008 - 57 & 35 40
8
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2005, for a detailed explanation).
Among the others, Aguila et al. (2011) estimate the effects on nondurable con-
sumption for US retired between the 1980 and 2000. They find that there is not
a significant reduction, instead they observe a reduction of food consumption at
retirement. Battistin et al. (2009) analyze the Italian situation finding a reduc-
tion of about the 10% of the nondurable expenditure and a reduction of about
the 14% of food expenditure for people at the threshold of the pension eligibil-
ity criteria. Others papers underline that the reduction in food expenditure is
caused by the increasing of the home production caused by the increment of the
leisure time (see among the others Luengo-Prado and Sevilla, 2013; Stancanelli
and Van Soest, 2012).
Other studies try to investigate what could be the effects, in a sociological
and psychological perspective, of retirement. For example is highly debate the
role of retirement on subjective well-being. Charles (2004) analyzes the effects
of retirement on well-being using as a source of exogenous variation the Social
Security Amendment of 1983 that in US discouraged retirement before 65 years
old and increased the benefits for people that decided to continue to work after
65. He focuses his attention on the voluntary retirement and shows that there is
an improvement of subjective well-being if is taken into account the endogeneity
of retirement (i.e. the people with lower well-being decide to withdraw from the
labor force). Bonsang and Klein (2012); Hershey and Henkens (2013), respectively
in Germany and in Netherlands, distinguish the role of voluntary and involuntary
retirement. Bonsang and Klein (2012) find, for voluntary retirement, a positive
effect on satisfaction with leisure time and a negative effect on satisfaction with
household income. They also underline as for involuntary retirement the effect on
satisfaction with income is more negative and the effect on satisfaction with leisure
is less positive in comparison with voluntary retirement. Hershey and Henkens
(2013) analyze the Satisfaction With Life (SWL) of Dutch retired. They show
as involuntary retirement has a negative effect on SWL, in particular when it is
caused by some health problems. Moreover the voluntary retirement seems to
have a negligible positive effect. Kim and Moen (2002) starting from data of the
employers of the New York State analyze the effect of retirement on morale and on
9
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the probability to have depressive symptoms . They find a positive effect on well
being for men that are just retired and this effects is bigger for those who have
the lower level of pre-retirement well-being. However they show that there is also
an increase in the probability to developing depressive symptoms. Finally they
do not find any effects for retired women. Bertoni and Brunello (2014) proposed
an analysis on the so called Retired Husband Syndrom in Japan. They estimate
the effect of the husband’s retirement on the wife’s health using the exogenous
variation provided by the 2006 revision of retirement eligibility criterion for the
cohorts born after the 1945. They find a negative effect on wife’s health and this
effect is exacerbate for employed women.
Gall et al. (1997) try to give some empirical evidence to the theory proposed
first of all by Atchley (1976) in which there is a positive short term effect of the
retirement on well-being (often defined as an honeymoon period), and a negative
effect in the middle-long term period. They show that 1 years after retirement
in Canada there is a positive effect on some indicators such as psychological
health, financial and interpersonal satisfaction and locus of control. However at
6-7 years after retirement they find a decrease of the interpersonal satisfaction
and of the psychological health, while the locus of control continue to increase
and the financial satisfaction remain stable.
2.2 Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana Survey
The aim is to evaluate the retirement effects using the exogenous variation caused
by the change in the eligibility criterion provided by the Dini’s Law. The first
step of that Law was the 1st January 1996 and it imposed that private sector
employers have reached at least 52 years of age and 35 years of contributions
or 36 years of contributions regardless of age (in comparison with 35 years of
contributions) to retire. However workers cannot retire in every moment of the
year because the law introduced also the so called retirement windows that are
fixed periods in which it is possible to stop to work (see Leombruni et al., 2012,
for details). For that reason in private sector most of the retirements are in the
31th December and the first day of retirement is the 1st January of the next year.
10
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So we expect that the first reduction in the number of retired are in 1997. It is
reasonable to suppose that the reforms has involved a very selected part of the
population, namely the individuals that have reached 35 years of contribution at
age of 51. So we expect that they started to work very young, and, consequently,
they have a low level of education.
In order to understand how the reforms have changed the retirement proba-
bility across different cohorts, we need a data source that allow us to compare, at
a given age, people born in different years. Moreover these data should provide
information about health, interpersonal, family and economic satisfaction, use of
leisure time etc.
For all of these reasons we have decided to start from the survey named Aspetti
della Vita Quotidiana (Aspects of Daily Life, hereafter AVQ) carried out by the
Italian National Statistical Office. This survey each year involves about 50000
individuals belonging to about 20000 households and it is a part of an integrated
system of social surveys called Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie (The Multipur-
pose Surveys on Household). It covers the period from 1993 to 2012 (excluding
2004) for a total of 19 datasets. It includes information about which is the qual-
ity of individual life, the degree of satisfaction of their conditions, their economic
situation, the area in which they live, the functioning of all public utility services.
As already said, we needed to compare across cohorts the retirement prob-
ability at a certain age. So we have fixed an age and we have extracted all
the records with that age in 4 surveys before the 1997 (1993-1996) and 4 after
1997 (1997-2000). Furthermore we wanted to observe if their outcomes change
across time but we do not have repeated measure for the same individuals, but
we could observe individuals with one year more in the next year survey. Obvi-
ously they are not the same individuals, but they are both representative of the
same population, for that reason it seems to be a reliable outcome to estimate
possibles delayed effects of retirement. Table 2.3 summarizes the sample size of
the obtained dataset for age 52.
11
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2.3 First Stage Estimation
In this section we display how the retirement probability is changed due to the
introduction of the Dini’s law. Moreover will be discussed the endogenous nature
of the retirement and because it is not possible just to compare the two groups
(retired and not retired) in order to obtain a causal estimand. Finally will be
presented some of the assumptions that are necessary to identify the causal effects.
Starting from the data described in the previous section, we have selected just the
records with the age of reference (in other words just the first row of the tables
in 2.3) and we have estimated simple linear probability models (see section 15.2
of Wooldridge, 2010) in the form:
D = α0 + α1Z + α2(X − 1997) + α3Z(X − 1997) + ζ, (2.1)
where D is a variable that is equal to one if the person is retired, zero otherwise;
X is the year of survey, Z = 1
¯{X≥1997}
and ζ is an error term with zero mean. The
form chosen in equation (2.1) is due to the necessity to consider the conditional
retirement probability as a function of the cohort membership. Moreover the
term that depends from Z is included to capture the change at the introduction
of the law. Finally the term related to Z(X − 1997) (the interaction term) is
included to have more flexibility in the conditional average and to underline how
the eligibility criteria of retirement have been progressively tightened. Section 3
will present the identification strategy just based on this interaction term. Figures
2.2 present the results for individual at age 52.
Results show how, before the introduction of the law, the retirement probabil-
ity is almost constant across cohorts. It is just possible to see a small increasing
trend, probably due to some anticipatory effects of the law (i.e. someone that is
eligible to retirement before the introduction of the law that in absence of reforms
would decided to continue to work, anticipates his retirement decision. This be-
cause he is worried about not being eligible anymore after the introduction of
the law). After the introduction of the law, is evident a decreasing trend that
underlines how progressively less people are eligible to retirement. However does
not appear any relevant reduction in the number of retirees at the first step of
13
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Figure 2.2: Retirement Probability across cohorts – Age 52
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the law sign that very few people are affected in that moment by the reform.
Retirement is complex decision in the life cycle of a person. It involved sev-
eral aspects and it could be only partially explained by observed indicators. In
econometric theory retirement is defined endogenous for outcomes such as sub-
jective well-being, consumptions etc., in the sense that these outcomes influence
the retirement decision, but the retirement status itself has an effect on these out-
comes. More generally retirement is not randomly assigned so the comparisons
between retired and workers is deeply affected by the so called Selection Bias (see
Heckman, 1979) that is the differences between the two groups that there would
be even if no one would be retired. Following Rubin (1974) we can define as Yi(1)
the value of referring outcome if the unit i decides to retire and Yi(0) the value of
the same outcome for the same unit if he decides not to retire (usually Y (1) and
Y (0) are defined Potential Outcomes); and we could just observe the difference:
E[Y (1)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 0] = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|D = 1]
+ E[Y (0)|D = 1]− E[Y (0)|D = 0],
where the blue part represents the effect of retirement for the retired group and
14
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the red part is the already defined selection bias.
In addition to that, it is not possible to assume the independence between the
cohorts and the potential outcomes, so the independence between the X variable
and Y (1);Y (0).
In the next section will be discussed the assumptions and the identification
strategy.
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Chapter 3
Combining Jump and Kink ratio
As seen in chapter 2 there is not a relevant discontinuity in the retirement proba-
bility at the introduction of the law. However the progressive tightening provided
by the law creates a significative change of slope at the threshold point. In this
section we will motivate the identification strategy based on that change of slope.
3.1 Review of the literature
3.1.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression Discontinuity Design (hereafter RDD), first introduced by Thistleth-
waite and Campbell (1960), has found increasing success in the late ’90s (see
for example Hahn et al., 2001 for the identification assumption or Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010 for a review and a guide to practice). The
key idea is that the treatment is (totally or partially) determined by a threshold
point of an observed continuous variable (often defined assignment, forcing or
running variable).
Following Hahn et al. (2001) we can distinguish two cases of RDD: the sharp and
the fuzzy RDD. In the sharp RDD the treatment assignment is totally determined
by the running variable, so all the people that have a value of the running variable
greater (smaller) than the threshold point are included in the treatment group,
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instead all the people that have a value smaller (greater) are in the control group.
So defining as D the treatment indicator, that is equal to 1 if an observation is
in the treatment group and 0 otherwise, as X the running variable and as x0 the
threshold point, we have that:
D = 1
¯{X≥x0}
.
RDD situations are commonly known as a problem of causal inference where
there is completely absence of common support in the variable that determines
the exposition to the treatment. That is the reason why, without additional
assumptions or informations (see for example Angrist and Rokkanen, 2015; Dong
and Lewbel, 2012) it is just possible to estimate the Average Treatment Effect
(hereafter ATE) at the threshold point. In formula:
ATE = E[Y (1)− Y (0) |X = x0],
where Y (1) and Y (0) represent the Potential Outcomes already defined in the
previous section. In other words the average of the difference between the value
of the outcome variable that the people at the threshold point would have if they
had been treated (Y (1)) and the value that they would have in the control group
(Y (0)). Following that the observed outcome Y could be defined as:
Y = Y (1)D + Y (0)(1−D).
Assuming that the averages of the potential outcomes are continuos at the thresh-
old point, therefore:
lim
x→x+0
E[Y (1)|X = x] = lim
x→x−0
E[Y (1)|X = x]
lim
x→x+0
E[Y (0)|X = x] = lim
x→x−0
E[Y (0)|X = x],
(3.1)
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ATE at the threshold point is identified by the quantity β = y+ − y−, where:
y+ = lim
x→x+0
E[Y |X = x] y− = lim
x→x−0
E[Y |X = x]. (3.2)
Instead, in the fuzzy RDD, the treatment assignment is not a deterministic
function of the running variable, but it is influenced by others (observed or un-
observed) variables. However the probability to be treated is discontinuous at
the threshold point x0. In this situation we can assume that the running variable
just determines the assignment to treatment (Z), as:
Z = 1
¯{X≥x0}
.
As in Angrist et al. (1996); Imbens and Angrist (1994), for the general non-
compliance setting, it could be assumed that there are different, unobserved,
groups that have different reactions to the treatment assignment, as:
• Always-Taker (AT): D = 1, for Z = 0, 1
• Never-Taker (NT): D = 0, for Z = 0, 1
• Compliers (C): D = 1, for Z = 1 and D = 0, for Z = 0
• Defiers: D = 0, for Z = 1 and D = 1, for Z = 0.
Assuming that the Defiers group does not exist we can decompose the average of
the outcome Y above (Y +) and below (Y −) the threshold as:
E[Y +] = E[Y (1)+|AT ]Pr[AT ] + E[Y (0)+|NT ]Pr[NT ] + E[Y (1)+|C]Pr[C]
E[Y −] = E[Y (1)−|AT ]Pr[AT ] + E[Y (0)−|NT ]Pr[NT ] + E[Y (0)|C]Pr[C],
(3.3)
if we assume also the continuity at the threshold point (as in eq. (3.1)) of the
potential outcomes in the three groups and the continuity of the probability of
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belonging to a group:
lim
x→x+0
E[Y (t)|X = x&G] = lim
x→x−0
E[Y (t)|X = x&G] for: t = 0, 1 &G = AT,NT,C
lim
x→x+0
Pr[G|X = x0] = lim
x→x−0
Pr[G|X = x0] for: G = AT,NT,C
we have that the difference between y+ − y− is equal to E[Y (1) − Y (0)|X =
x0 &C]Pr[C|X = x0].
Using similar arguments we have that the difference between d+ − d−, where:
d+ = lim
x→x+0
E[D |X = x] d− = lim
x→x−0
E[D |X = x],
is equal to Pr[C|X = x0], so the ratio:
β =
y+ − y−
d+ − d− ,
identifies the so called Local Average Treatment Effect (hereafter LATE) at the
threshold point x0, that is the ATE at the threshold point for the subpopulation
of compliers, in formulas:
LATE = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|X = x0 &C]
3.1.1.1 Estimation
The ATE in the sharp RDD could obtained from the coefficient β1 of a linear
regression in the form:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3XD + , (3.4)
instead, in order to estimate the LATE in a fuzzy RDD, it’s necessary to compute
the ratio between γ1 and α1 in the equations:
Y = γ0 + γ1Z + γ2X + γ3XZ + υ (3.5)
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + ζ, (3.6)
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where the equation (3.5) is commonly called Intention To Treat (hereafter ITT)
equation and the equation (3.6) is also known as First Stage (hereafter FS) equa-
tion.
As showed by Hahn et al. (2001), that ratio is numerically equivalent to the
coefficient β1 of the Instrumental Variable (hereafter IV) regression of:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3XZ + , (3.7)
where D is considered endogenous and it is instrumented with the equation (3.6).
In other words Z is the additional instrument for the endogenous variable D.
The main problem concerns the fact that all the equations above hold if the
conditional averages of Y and D given X (above and below the threshold) are
linear. That condition is too strong to be realistic in the empirical applications.
This is the reason why usually the RDD could be viewed as a problem of estima-
tion of 2 (or 4 in the fuzzy RDD) boundary points. Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) propose a data-driven algorithm to estimate the optimal bandwidth in a
Local Linear Regression. Gelman and Imbens (2014) underline how using high
order polynomial estimation could generate estimates with unwanted properties,
as observations far from the threshold that are weighted more than observation
near the threshold. Instead Card et al. (2014) show that the use of Local Polyno-
mial Regressions in place of simple Local Linear Regressions in many case could
significantly improve the performance of the estimates.
3.1.2 Regression Kink Design
In the recent literature some papers investigate the treatment effect estimation
using the information given by the change of slope (defined as Kink in contrast
with the Jump of the standard RDD) in the treatment probability or in treatment
amount, the so called Regression Kink Design (from here RKD).
Some papers use the RKD in order to estimate the effects of a continuos treatment.
These are the situations in which all the sample could be considered as treated,
but the intensity of the treatment received varies across individuals. The intensity
of the treatment varies following a deterministic (sharp RKD) or stochastic (fuzzy
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RKD) rule on the basis of a running variable. The same rule provides that in
some point the relation between the amount of the treatment and the running
variable change, creating a kink. One example is the paper by Simonsen et al.
(2015) studies the price sensitivity of demand for prescription drug using the
kinked reimbursement schemes provided by the Danish law. Instead Card et al.
(2012) investigate the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on the duration
of joblessness in Austria, where the benefit schedule has kinks at the minimum
and maximum benefit level. They also provide some conditions under which the
RKD identifies the “treatment-on-the-treated” parameter formulated by Florens
et al. (2008).
Dong (2014) investigates the information given by the Kink-ratio in a fuzzy
RDD, so in a binary treatment setting (under RCM). They key idea is to com-
pute the derivatives with respect to X of the averages of Y (above and below the
threshold) and assuming, joint with the standard RDD assumptions, the conti-
nuity in derivatives of the potential outcomes and of the probability of belonging
to a specific group, so:
lim
x→x+0
∂E[Y (t)|X = x]
∂X
= lim
x→x−0
∂E[Y (t)|X = x]
∂X
for: t = 0, 1
lim
x→x+0
∂Pr[G|X = x]
∂X
= lim
x→x−0
∂Pr[G|X = x0]
∂X
for: G = AT,NT,C;
(3.8)
we obtain that the following equations:
∂(y+ − y−)
∂X
= E[Y (1)− Y (0)|C &X = x0]∂Pr[C|X = x0]
∂X
+
∂E[Y (1)− Y (0)|C &X = x0]
∂X
Pr[C|X = x0]
∂(d+ − d−)
∂X
=
∂Pr[C|X = x0]
∂X
,
(3.9)
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so the Kink-ratio is equal to:
∂(y+ − y−)/∂X
∂(d+ − d−)/∂X = E[Y (1)− Y (0)|C &X = x0]
+
∂E[Y (1)− Y (0)|C &X = x0]
∂X
Pr[C|X = x0]
∂Pr[C|X = x0]/∂X .
(3.10)
From equation (3.10) we can obtain the following conclusions:
• In general, the Kink-ratio is a combination of the LATE and another Bias
term
• If there is no Jump in the treatment probability or if the first derivative of
the LATE is equal to zero or both, the Kink-ratio is an unbiased estimator
for the LATE.
She also shows that the Kink-ratio, that is equal to the ratio of the coefficients
γ3 and α3 in the equations (3.5) and (3.6), could be obtained from the coefficient
β1 of an IV regression in the form:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3Z + ,
where D is considered endogenous and it is instrumented by the equation (3.6).
In other words, XZ is the additional instrument for the endogenous variable D.
Then Dong analyzes in detail the case in which the Kink-ratio is not biased
because the first derivatives of LATE is equal to zero. In that case it is possible
to combine the Jump and the Kink-ratio, in order to minimize the variance of
the combination. She suggests to estimate an IV regression in the form:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + ,
where the endogenous variable D is instrumented by the equation (3.6). In that
case, the model is over-identified, because there are more additional instruments
(Z and XZ) with respect to endogenous variables (D). It is easy to show that
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the coefficient β1 is a combination of the Jump and the Kink-ratio, in the form:
β1 =
wJAγ1 + w
K
A γ3
wJAα1 + w
K
Aα3
, (3.11)
where the coefficients γ1, γ3, α1, α3 are the ones of the equations (3.5) and (3.6),
and the weights are equal to:
wJA = α1Var[z] + α3Cov[z, xz]
wKA = α1Cov[z, xz] + α3Var[xz],
(3.12)
where z and xz are respectively the residuals of the equations:
Z = λ0 + λ1X + z
XZ = κ0 + κ1X + xz
(3.13)
3.2 A combined version of the RDD & RKD
estimators
Here we propose an alternative model that combines the Jump and the Kink ratio.
The aim is to find a combination that improves the estimate of the LATE (in
comparison to the standard Jump ratio). The idea is to find a proper combination
of the ratios when the Kink ratio is potentially biased and the Jump ratio is too
inaccurate to be used.
In our model, we explicitly introduce the first derivative of the LATE (XD) in
the structural model and we consider it as an endogenous variable. We use as
instruments the variable Z and XZ, in this way the model is exactly identified.
So the structural equation becomes:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3XD + , (3.14)
and the first stage equations are the one in (3.6) and:
XD = δ0 + δ1Z + δ2X + δ3XZ + η. (3.15)
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As usual the parameter of interest is represented by the coefficient β1 related to
D in the structural equation.
It is easy to show that the obtained coefficient (as the model proposed by Dong
in equation (3.11)) is a combination of the Jump and the Kink ratio in the form:
β1 =
wJBγ1 + w
K
B γ3
wJBα1 + w
K
Bα3
, (3.16)
where the weights are equal to:
wJB = {δ1Cov[z, xz] + δ3Var[xz]}Var[z]
− {δ1Var[z] + δ3Cov[z, xz]}Cov[x, xz]
wKB = {δ1Cov[z, xz] + δ3Var[xz]}Cov[z, xz]
− {δ1Var[z] + δ3Cov[z, xz]}Var[xz].
(3.17)
From equations (3.17) it is clear that the weights given to the two ratios depend
from the variance and covariance matrix of z and xz, that depends only on some
conditional and unconditional moments of the running variable (see appendix B),
and the coefficients of the equation (3.15). So the value of the coefficients of the
first stage of XD is crucial to determine the proportion between the Jump and the
Kink ratio in the combined estimator. Assuming that the true data generating
process (hereafter DGP) of the variable D is the one expressed in equation (3.6),
and ζ has zero mean, we have that:
E[D|X] = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ,
consequently the conditional mean of XD is equal to:
E[XD|X] = XE[D|X] = α0X + α1XZ + α2X2 + α3X2Z. (3.18)
It is straightforward from equation (3.18) to see that in the conditional mean of
XD there is not a term that depends just from Z, so, if the model is correctly
specified (in that case it is estimated with a second order polynomial), δ1 = 0
and δ3 = α1. If we substitute zero to δ1 in the equation (3.17) we see that w
K
B
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is equal to zero and the model reduces to the standard Jump ratio. Therefore in
order to obtain a combination that includes both the Jump and the Kink ratio, it
is necessary that the FS for XD is “miss-specified”. It is important to underline
that in the proposed model, the ITT and the two FS equations are estimated
with the same polynomial order, so if the FS equation for XD is miss-specified
it does not mean that the FS equation for D is miss-specified too.
3.3 Simulation Study
Here we propose a simulation study in which we can compare the performance
(expressed in terms of Root Mean Square Error, hereafter RMSE) of the different
estimators.
The data are generated from a structural equation in the form:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3(X ·D) + , (3.19)
where D is generated from the unobserved variable D?, that has the following
DGP:
D? = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ, (3.20)
and D = 1(D? ≥ 0). As showed in the previous section it is important to control
the polynomial order of the FS equation, so we generate υ from an uniform
distribution between −1 and 1.
In order to create endogeneity in the equation (3.19), we have to impose that
Cov[, υ] 6= 0, consequently we generate  as:
 = F−1
(
υ + 1
2
)
+N,
where F−1(.) is the inverse of the distribution function of a uniform between 0 and
1 and N ∼ N(0, σ2). In that model the level of endogeneity could be controlled
with the parameter σ2.
The choice of the uniform distribution in the error of the equation (3.20) is because
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the conditional expectation of D is in the form:
E[D|X] = Pr[D? ≥ 0|X =] = Pr[α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ ≥ 0|X]
= Pr[−υ ≤ α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ|X]
= Pr[υ ≤ α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ|X]
= Fυ|X(α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ)
=
α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ − 1
2
,
(3.21)
where Fυ|X(.) is the distribution function of a uniform between −1 and 1, and in
the second row is used the fact that −υ is also distributed as a uniform between
−1 and 1.
Substituting the equation (3.21) in the conditional average of Y , we obtain:
E[Y |X] = β0 + β1E[D|X] + β2X + β3XE[D|X]
= β0 +
α0β1
2
+
α1β1
2
Z +
(
α2β1 + α1β3
2
+ β1
)
X
+
α3β1 + α1β3
2
XZ +
α2β3
2
X2 +
α3β3
2
X2Z
= γ0 + γ1Z + γ2X + γ3XZ + γ4X
2 + γ5X
2Z,
(3.22)
so the conditional average of Y , in order to obtain unbiased coefficients of the
ITT equation have to be estimate with a second order polynomial.
We simulate the value of X as an uniform between (−h, h), in order to be sym-
metric around the threshold point (zero). First of all we choose the value of the
Jump (J) and the Kink (K) in the first stage, after that we fix four points in the
conditional average of D. We want that in the point −h the mean of is equal
to one, in the point 0− to zero, in the point 0+ to J and in the point h is still
equal to one. Finally we choose the value of h to fix the kink when the value of
the jump is increased. It is easy to show that the corresponding values of the
parameters α are:
h = 2−J
K
α0 = −1 α1 = − 2h
α2 = 2J α3 =
2
h
(2− J) . (3.23)
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Figure 3.1: Conditional average of the first stage equation for K = 1
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In Figure 3.1 is showed the trend of E[D|X] fixing the value of K and varying
the value of J . It is evident that increasing the value of J the range of the running
variable X decrease in order to keep constant the change of slope at the threshold
point.
In the equation of the outcome Y , described in (3.19), the bias term of the Kink
ratio is controlled by the coefficient β3. It is easy to show that L
′ = (β3 · J)/K,
where L′ is the first derivative of the LATE at the threshold point. So, we fix
the value of L′ and, given the value of K and J , we choose the value of β3.
Summarizing the parameter of the equation (3.19) are:
β0 = 1.5 β1 = 2
β2 = −0.4 β3 = K·L′J .
(3.24)
We want to understand both the finite sample properties and the asymptotic
properties of the different estimators, for this reason we fix four dimension of the
sample sizes (500, 1000, 3000, 5000 observations). In addition to that we want to
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compare the different estimators both when the Kink ratio is or is not biased, so
the simulation results are presented for L′ = 0 (table 3.1) and for L′ = 0.5 (table
3.2). Then for each sample size we replicate the estimates 2000 times and finally
we compute the Root Mean Square Error of the estimators.
In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are represented the performance of the following esti-
mators:
• Jump ratio: It is the standard RDD estimator. This is the ratio between
the coefficients γ1 and α1 respectively in the equations (3.5) and (3.6).
• Kink ratio: It is the Kink ratio expressed by the ratio of the coefficients
γ3 and α3.
• Dong’s Model: It is the combination of the Jump and the Kink ratio
obtained by the IV regression proposed by Dong (2014).
• Two Endogenous Model: It is the combination of the Jump and the
Kink ratio described in Section 3.2. For the same estimator is presented
also the percentage of rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
related to XD is equal to zero.
• IK Opt. Band.: In these cells are represented the RMSE of the estimator
obtained using the algorithm proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
to estimate the Optimal Bandwidth in a Local Linear Regression.
As seen before in the simulation the ITT is a second order polynomial and the FS
equation is linear, consequently the XD is quadratic too. For these reason if the
model is estimated with a linear IV regression, the ITT equation is miss-specified,
instead if we estimate a quadratic regression (controlling for X2 and X2Z too) the
FS equation is over-specified. Moreover in the quadratic regression the coefficients
δ1 of the equation (3.15) is equal to zero and the combined estimator described
in (3.16) and (3.17) reduces to the standard Jump ratio. In order to study the
performance of our model (in comparison to the other model described before)
have been reported the estimates with the first and the second polynomial order.
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3. Combining Jump and Kink ratio
The results show as, in that choice of the parameters (very small Jump and
large Kink), the standard Jump ratio has very poor performance. Instead the
Kink ratio, for every sample size, value of J and polynomial order, has better
performance, even if, for J > 0 and L′ 6= 0, it is a biased estimator for the
LATE. Moreover the estimator proposed by Dong, when the first derivative of
the LATE is different from zero, is not able to improve the performance of the
simple Kink ratio. Instead, when L′ = 0 and J > 0 it is the estimator with the
best performance.
Additional consideration have to be done for the model that include XD as an
additional endogenous variable:
1. The best performances of the estimator are for p = 1, in other words when
the XD equation is miss-specified, for p = 2 the performance of the model
has very poor performance.
2. When the Kink ratio is biased, it is the best estimator, among the consid-
ered, for every value of J and n.
3. When J > 0 the t-test related to the XD coefficient is able to discriminate
when to use the Dong’s model of the model with two endogenous variables.
4. The better improvement are for small (but not zero) value of J e.g. J = 0.1.
So, in general, the simulation results show an improvement of the performance of
the two endogenous estimator in comparison to the others estimator, when the
XD equation is miss-specified and the combined estimator is different from the
standard Jump ratio.
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Chapter 4
Results with Aspetti della Vita
Quotidiana Survey
In this section results will be presented and discussed on well-being using the
estimators proposed in section 3. We started the first row of the tables in 2.3,
extracting all the individuals with 52 y.o. in the different cohorts. Moreover we
have extracted the five questions regarding their subjective personal satisfaction.
These questions involve their satisfaction about:
1. economic situation,
2. health status,
3. family relation,
4. friend relation,
5. leisure time.
Each respondent has to reply according to a likert scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is
extremely and 4 is not at all. We want to understand how the retirement could
increase the probability to be dissatisfied in these five topics, for this reason we
have created a set of dummy variables (one for each question) that are equal to
1 if the respondent answers 4 (not at all), zero otherwise. Table 4.1 summarizes
the distribution of the answers of the respondents.
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We have estimated the effects using both the model with two endogenous and
Answer
Extremely Very Slightly Not at all
M
al
e
Economic Satistif. 75 1406 888 274
Health Satisf. 443 1768 348 85
Fam. Rel. Satisf. 983 1496 123 31
Friend Rel. Satisf. 642 1624 313 58
Leisure Time Satisf. 318 1223 894 201
F
em
al
e
Economic Satistifaction 71 1327 983 297
Health Satisf. 326 1724 515 119
Fam. Rel. Satisf. 1027 1508 115 28
Friend Rel. Satisf. 617 1629 341 86
Leisure Time Satisf. 293 1238 917 225
Table 4.1: Frequency distribution of the outcome variables about personal satis-
faction
the model proposed by Dong. Moreover we have estimated the IV-regressions
using the simple linear probability model based on two stage least squares and, in
order to take into account the binary nature of the dependent variable, a probit-
IV. This model is also based on two stage least squares algorithm and consists of
the following steps:
1. to estimate the first stage regressions of the endogenous variable on the
exogenous variables and the additional instruments using ordinary least
squares
2. to compute the residuals of the FS regressions
3. to use that in the structural equation, estimated using a standard probit
regression, in addition to the exogenous and the endogenous variables,
(see Rivers and Vuong, 1988, for details and for standard error calculation).
Table 4.2 summarizes the results for the different outcomes and estimators.
For each estimator the coefficients is shown of the variabile related to the retire-
ment status, and in parenthesis its standard error. In the probit-IV regression,
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4. Results with Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana Survey
marginal effects are also reported at the threshold point, computed as:
Φ(βˆ0 + βˆ1)− Φ(βˆ0),
where β0 and β1 are respectively the constant term and the coefficient related to
D of the structural equation. The coefficients related to the running variable are
omitted because we are interested in the marginal effect in the threshold point,
so (X − 1997) = 0. Finally, for the model with two endogenous variables the
p-values related to the significance test of the coefficients related to XD are re-
ported, in order to understand if the model with two endogenous variables or the
Dong’s model have to be preferred.
In any case, the coefficient related to XD is not significant, so the second en-
dogenous variable could be omitted. Results, obtained with the Dong’s model,
show a negative effect on economic satisfaction for males and on friend relations
for females, both significant at the 10% level. However no difference appears in
the others outcomes.
4.1 Subsample selection
In this section we show some results obtained selecting a subsample of the data.
The aim is to provide some robustness check of the results or some stratifica-
tion that want to try to understand how the results are heterogeneous in the
population.
4.1.1 Robustness
In RDD applications is crucial to determine what is the maximum distance from
the threshold that have to be included in the sample. The trade off, as usual, is
between bias and variance. The inclusion of observation too far from the thresh-
old could cause an increase of the bias of the estimates, because it is imposed a
linear (or polynomial) trend for a large range of the running variable. However
if the bandwidth is reduced, observations are dropped from the sample and the
variance of the estimates increases.
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For this reason we have decided to drop the two extreme (with respect to the
threshold point) cohorts of the sample (so all the people with 52 y.o. in 1993 and
2000) in order to provide a robustness check.
Table 4.3 summarizes the results. in the first two rows are reported the coeffi-
Table 4.3: Results with bandwidth reduction
Male Female
Coeff. S.Err. Coeff. S.Err.
FS: Z .0253 (.0384) .023 (.0317)
FS: XZ -.0608∗∗∗ (.0218) -.0236 (.0177)
Economic disatisf. .4966 (.3063) .8742 (.7612)
Health disatisf. .1102 (.1505) .2959 (.4033)
Family relation disatisf. -.0148 (.0954) .353 (.278)
Friend relation disatisf. .0058 (.1178) .7044 (.5192)
Leisure time disatisf. .0718 (.2271) .1094 (.5045)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cients and the related standard error of the Jump and the Kink in the first stage
regressions. The last five rows refer to the coefficient related to D in the Dong’s
model.
Results are closed to the ones showed in table 4.2. They have all the same sign
(excepted for the one related to the Family relation satisfaction, that is really
closed to zero) and the size is comparable. However for female both the instru-
ments lose their significance, so also the IV estimates become unreliable.
4.1.2 Stratification
As seen before the structure of the reforms involves a very specific part of the
population: the workers that drop out very early from school and that have
started to work really young. For this reason we have decided to exclude from
the sample all the individuals with high educational attainment (high school or
university graduates). These individuals are plausibly unaffected by the reform,
because they do not have reached the 35 years of contribution.
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Table 4.4: Results excluding individuals with high educational attainment
Male Female
Coeff. S.Err. Coeff. S.Err.
FS: Z .0542 (.0345) -.0124 (.0245)
FS: XZ -.051∗∗∗ (.0152) -.0217∗∗ (.0106)
Economic disatisf. .4622∗ (.2425) .8743 (.6952)
Health disatisf. .089 (.117) .478 (.4198)
Family relation disatisf. .0661 (.0724) .3641 (.2466)
Friend relation disatisf. -.0202 (.0924) .5964 (.4237)
Leisure time disatisf. .1459 (.1799) .2529 (.5072)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.4 summarizes the results. The results confirm the ones proposed in
table 4.2, with a negative effect for males in the economic satisfaction (statistically
significant at the 0.1 level) and no significant effects in the other outcomes.
In addition to that, another relevant stratification is between Southern and
Northern Italy. As known the Northern Italy is characterized by an higher fraction
of workers that are employed in the private sector. For this reason it is reasonable
to suppose that this is the area more affected by the reforms.
Results are in tables 4.5. First stage regressions show how the reform has
an effect in the retirement probability only in the Northern Italy, in particular
for males that have both a significant Jump and Kink. The coefficients of the
first stage regression about Southern Italy do not provide enough information
to identify the retirement effect and this is particularly evident looking at the
coefficients of the IV regressions for females. Results confirm the negative effect
on the economic satisfaction for males (just in the Northern Italy).
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North South
Coeff. S.Err. Coeff. S.Err.
FS: Z coef. .1369∗∗ (.0536) -.0035 (.044)
FS: XZ coef. -.0694∗∗∗ (.0238) -.0364∗ (.0193)
Economic disatisf. .3584∗∗ (.1814) .4799 (.5898)
Health disatisf. .1055 (.0951) -.086 (.2865)
Family relation disatisf. .043 (.0547) .0944 (.1854)
Friend relation disatisf. -.0289 (.086) .0409 (.2044)
Leisure time disatisf. .1695 (.136) .0442 (.445)
(a) Male
North South
Coeff. S.Err. Coeff. S.Err.
FS: Z coef. .009 (.0423) -.0104 (.0261)
FS: XZ coef. -.0373∗∗ (.0186) -.0081 (.0111)
Economic disatisf. .1469 (.3933) 2.9837 (4.4545)
Health disatisf. .2999 (.28) 1.9137 (2.7996)
Family relation disatisf. .219 (.1781) .7182 (1.1269)
Friend relation disatisf. .2813 (.2373) .3207 (1.33)
Leisure time disatisf. -.0092 (.3636) 1.83 (3.0485)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Female
Table 4.5: North-South Stratification
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Chapter 5
Two Sample Instrumental
Variable
In this section it will be explained how to use two sample instrumental variable
in a RDD setting in order to:
a. Improve the accuracy of the estimates with administrative data
b. Obtain delayed effects of retirement.
The Two Sample Instrumental Variable (hereafter TSIV) estimator was first pro-
posed by Angrist and Krueger (1992), and more recently improved by Inoue and
Solon (2010). The key idea is very simple and it consists on estimating moments
on two complementary data source. In steps:
1. Estimating the FS regression using a data source
2. Using the coefficients estimated in the previous step in the other dataset to
obtain the fitted values of the endogenous variables
3. Finally it possible to estimate the structural equation using the fitted value.
So defining as Y (d) the (n(d) × 1) outcome, as X(d) the (n(d) × p + k) matrix
that includes the set of the endogenous (p) and exogenous variables (k) and as
Z() the (n(d) × q + k) (with q ≥ p) matrix that includes the set of the additional
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instruments (q) and the exogenous variables, where d = 1, 2 denotes if they belong
to the first or to the second sample, we have the FS equations estimated with the
second sample are, in matrix form:
X(2) = αZ(2) + υ,
where υ is a (n(2) × p + k) matrix with the last k columns identically equal to
zero. The previous equations could be estimated using standard OLS in order
to obtain the values αˆ that have to be used to obtain the fitted values of the
endogenous variables in the first sample as:
Xˆ(1) = αˆZ(1),
finally the structural equation could be estimated with the regression:
Y (1) = βXˆ(1) + .
The previous equations show how it is necessary to observe (Y ;Z) in the first
sample and (X;Z) in the second sample, so Z has to be observed in both samples.
In a RDD context we just need three variables: the outcome, the treatment
indicator and the forcing variable, all the other variables (Z, XZ, XD) are just
functions of the forcing variable and of the treatment indicator . Consequently
whatever is the model, among the proposed in section 3, that we want to estimate
we need to observe the outcome and the forcing variable in the first sample and
the treatment indicator and the forcing variable in the second sample.
5.1 The Work Histories Italian Panel database
The Work Histories Italian Panel (hereafter Whip) is a statistical database con-
structed from administrative data of the Italian National Institute of Social Se-
curity (hereafter Inps). It includes the work histories of the private (non agri-
cultural) sector workers. Inps has extracted all the records contained in their
administrative archives related to the individuals born in 24 different days (re-
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gardless of the year of birth) for a sample size of about 1:15 of the entire Inps
population. For each worker we are able to observe:
1. the working career, including yearly wages, type of contract etc.
2. the unemployment periods
3. the retirement.
It allows to estimate the first stage regression with a larger sample size (table 5.1
summarizes the sample size of Whip in comparison to the AVQ survey) and to
know exactly when a worker is retired.
Table 5.1: Sample size of Whip in comparison to AVQ survey
Survey
AVQ Whip
Male 2,697 117,908
Female 2,747 44,301
In order to make comparable the FS regressions with the ones obtained using
survey data, we choose four cohort before and four cohorts after the introduc-
tion of the new eligibility criterion for retirement. Moreover we have used the
retirement archive to understand when the individuals have retired. In this way
we was able to understand how many people was retired at age 52, and we have
reconstructed the treatment dummy variable.
Table 5.2 and figure 5.1 summarize the results of the FS regressions. They
show a relevant reduction in the standard errors of the coefficients in comparison
to the ones obtained with the AVQ survey.
Table 5.3 shows the results obtained with the TSIV estimator, in which, FS
regression are estimated with the Whip data source and the structural equation
is estimated with AVQ survey. Standard Errors are computed using bootstrap
algorithms. In comparison to the results proposed in table 4.2 for females, we can
see a significative negative effect (an increase in the probability to be dissatisfied)
in family and in friend relations and a negative effect, significant at 10 percent
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Figure 5.1: First Stage Estimation using Whip for 52
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Table 5.2: First Stage Comparison
Male Female
AVQ Whip AVQ Whip
X 0.0103 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0068 0.0029
(0.0096) (0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0024)
Z 0.0355 -0.0052 0.0210 -0.0030
(0.0311) (0.0044) (0.0257) (0.0075)
XZ -0.0520∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0018) (0.0109) (0.0031)
Constant 0.2005∗∗∗ 0.1738∗∗∗ 0.1155∗∗∗ 0.1700∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0064)
Observations 2697 117908 2747 44301
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
44
5.2. Delayed effects
Table 5.3: Estimates for 52 y.o. population obtained combining AVQ and Whip
data source
Male Female
Coef. Stand. Err. Coef. Stand. Err.
Economic Dissatisfaction .638∗ (.345) 1.117∗ (.652)
Health Dissatisfaction .186 (.199) .429 (.413)
Fam. Rel. Dissatisfaction .109 (.107) .499∗∗ (.226)
Friend Rel. Dissatisfaction -.082 (.155) .793∗∗ (.386)
Leisure Time Dissatisfaction .489∗ (.296) .542 (.552)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
level, for the economic satisfaction. Moreover we can see, for males, a negative
effect, significant at 10% level, for economic and leisure time satisfaction. All the
coefficients confirm the direction of the estimates obtained with just the AVQ
survey.
5.2 Delayed effects
Indeed in this section it will be explained how to use the TSIV estimator to
identify what are the effects of retirement some years after.
Atchley (1976) first has proposed the theory that after retirement there is a
positive short-term effect, often called an honeymoon period, on the subjective
satisfaction. After that period, it starts a decline in their subjective well-being
with a consequently negative effect.
In our idea, we want to observe people some years after the comparison proposed
in the previous section, but, unfortunately, AVQ survey does not provide any
repeated measure of the same individuals. However we are able to observe in the
next waves, some individuals that are representative of the same cohort, in the
following years.
For this reason we have decided to construct the dataset as in table 2.3, and to
use the first row of the table (so all the people aged 52 y.o. in the different waves)
to estimate the first stage regression and the other rows to estimate the structural
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equations. In this way we are able to identify the effects of the retirement at 52
y.o. in their well-being from 1 to 6 year after.
It have to be underlined that the cohorts involved by the reform have just
postponed their retirement, so the comparison between the two groups some
years later, is a combination of two main effects:
1. The evolution of the subjective well-being for retired people. So how their
status changes after some years of retirement.
2. The change of retirement status for the control group. So after some years
the cohorts involved by the pension reform become eligible to retirement
and change their status.
Figure 5.2 shows the results for 52 y.o. Male. On the horizontal axis is represented
the year after the 52 y.o., instead the vertical axis represents the estimate of the
retirement effect. Each point of the graph represent a pointwise estimate and the
shaded area is the 95% bootstrap confidence interval of the estimate.
Results show a negative effect on the economic satisfaction that persists also one
year after the retirement. It does not appear any effects after two years. In the
third year after retirement there is a positive effect; this is probably due to a
mix of an attenuation effect for the retired people at 52 and to the fact that the
control group involved in the reforms has just retired. After the fourth year the
distance between the two groups starts to reduce and cannot be deduced any
significative difference.
Results show also a negative effect on leisure time satisfaction one year after
the retirement. That difference completely disappear starting from the third
year. Finally it does not appear any effect on health, family and friend relation
satisfaction.
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Figure 5.2: Delayed effects 52 Male
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis we have analyzed how to use in the proper way the information
provided by the change of slope in a Regression Discontinuity Design.
First we have analyzed the pension reforms that took place in Italy starting
from ’90s. We have focused our attention on the Dini’s law of the 1995 that has in-
creased the eligibility criterion for the seniority pension. The law has introduced
two different ways to access to retirement: the first based on an age requirement
in addition to 35 years of contribution, the second just based on years of contri-
bution. Moreover this law provided a transition period of progressive tightening
of the requirements in order to increase eligibility criterion to 57 years of age and
35 of contribution or 40 years of contribution regardless of age. We have showed
how this law has created a reduction of the retirement probability across cohorts
comparing individuals at the same age. Further we have showed that the intro-
duction of the law as in the standard RDD settings represents a weak instrument
for the estimation of the retirement effects. However the progression provided by
the law represents a strong instrument in order to base the identification strategy
on this change of slope (Kink, in comparison to the Jump of the standard RDD)
at the threshold point.
For this reason we have reviewed the recent literature on Regression Kink
Design, showing that the Kink ratio, in a binary treatment setting, is a potentially
biased estimator of the parameter of interest, the Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE) and its bias depends on the unobserved first derivative of the LATE
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6. Conclusions
with respect to the running variable, computed in the threshold point. We have
compared the existing models based on Instrumental Variables regressions based
on the Jump and the Kink ratio. We have then proposed an alternative model that
includes the interaction between the treatment variable and the forcing variable
as an endogenous variable. The aim is to control for the first derivative of the
LATE in the structural equation. We have described how the resulting estimator
is a combination of the Jump and the Kink ratio.
We have proposed a simulation study to compare the different estimators
when the Jump ratio is too inaccurate to be used. Results have showed how
our model provides an improvement of the efficiency of the estimator when the
Kink ratio is biased. Moreover the t-test related to the interaction term is able
to determine when the first derivative of the LATE is different from zero.
Then, using the survey named Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana edited by the
Italian National Statistical Office, we have estimated the effects of retirement on
subjective well-being for individuals of age 52. Results show a negative effect
on the economic satisfaction for males and on friend relations satisfaction for
females. However retirement does not appear to affect health, family relation,
friend relation and leisure time satisfaction for males and on economic, health,
family relation and leisure time satisfaction for females.
Finally we have generalized the results using the Two Sample Instrumental
Variable (TSIV) estimator, first proposed by Angrist and Krueger (1992). This
is based on the use of complementary data sources to estimate an IV regression.
The First Stage regression is estimated with one dataset. Then the coefficients
are used to obtain the fitted values of the endogenous regressors in the other
dataset. Finally the fitted values are used to estimate the structural equation.
We have used that estimator in he RDD setting to estimate the first stage regres-
sion using administrative data that come from the National Institute of Social
Security. These data have a larger sample size and provides information on when
exactly the worker is retired. We have use administrative data with survey data
in order to improve the accuracy of the IV estimator. Results confirm all the signs
of the coefficients obtained with just survey data, but they show also a significant
negative effect on family relation satisfaction for females.
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We also used the TSIV estimator in order to construct delayed outcomes of the
same cohorts using the following waves of the survey data. We wanted to un-
derstand how the retirement effects persist some years after the retirement. Un-
fortunately, this survey does not provide any repeated measure for the same
individuals, but the individuals in the following waves are representative of the
same cohorts, for this reason the use of the TSIV estimator was necessary. Re-
sults show a negative effect in economic and leisure time satisfaction that persists
also one year after the retirement.
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Appendix A
Alternative specifications of the
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A. Alternative specifications of the IV regression
In this appendix it will be showed the correspondence between the Jump and
the Kink ratio and the IV regressions. Defining the ITT as:
Y = γ0 + γ1Z + γ2X + γ3XZ + ζ,
and the FS equations as:
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ.
The Jump ratio (τJ) and the Kink ratio (τK) are respectively defined as:
τJ =
γ1
α1
τK =
γ3
α3
Jump ratio
The standard Jump ratio is obtained from the coefficient β1 of the equation:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3XZ + ,
where D is instrumented by:
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ
According to the Frisch–Waugh–Lovell theorem, the coefficient β of the regres-
sion:
Y = α + βX1 + γX2 + 
could be equivalently estimated from the residuals of the regression of Y on X2
regressed on the residuals of X1 on X2. We can remove the exogenous variables
taking y, d e z respectively as the residuals of the regressions of Y , D and Z on
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X and XZ. So we have that the structural and the first stage regression become:
y = β1d+ 
d = α1z + υ,
and the ITT becomes:
y = γ1z + ζ,
therefore the IV estimator of β1 is equal to:
βIV1 =
Cov[y, z]
Cov[d, z]
=
Cov[γ1z, z]
Cov[α1z, z]
=
γ1Var[z]
α1Var[z]
=
γ1
α1
.
Kink ratio
The Kink ratio is obtained with the structural equation:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3Z + ,
where D is instrumented with:
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ.
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A. Alternative specifications of the IV regression
Defining as y, d e xz respectively the residuals of the regressions of Y , D e XZ
on X e su Z, we have that the structural and the FS equations reduce to:
y = β1d+ 
d = α3xz + υ,
and the ITT to:
y = γ3xz + ζ.
so the IV estimator is equal to:
βIV1 =
Cov[y, xz]
Cov[d, xz]
=
Cov[γ3xz, xz]
Cov[α3xz, xz]
=
γ3Var[xz]
α3Var[xz]
=
γ3
α3
Dong’s estimator
The structural equation is:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + ,
where D is instrumented with
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ
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As usual, defining asy, d, z e xz respectively the residuals of the regressions of Y ,
D, Z and XZ on X, we obtain that the structural and the FS equations become:
y = β1d+ 
d = α1z + α3xz + υ,
and the ITT equation:
y = γ1z + γ3xz + ζ.
The IV estimator of β1 is equal:
βIV1 =
Cov[y, α1z + α3(xz)]
Cov[d, α1z + α3(xz)]
=
Cov[γ1z + γ3(xz), α1z + α3(xz)]
Cov[d, α1z + α3(xz)]
=
α1γ1Var[z] + (α1γ3 + α3γ1)Cov[z, (xz)] + α3γ3Var[(xz)]
α1Cov[d, z] + α3Cov[d, (xz)]
=
γ1(α1Var[z] + α3Cov[z, (xz)]) + γ3(α1Cov[z, (xz)] + α3Var[(xz)])
α1Cov[d, z] + α3Cov[d, (xz)]
=
γ1Cov[d, z] + γ3Cov[d, (xz)]
α1Cov[d, z] + α3Cov[d, (xz)]
So the IV estimator is a combination of the Jump and the Kink ratio in the form:
τ =
wJAγ1 + w
K
A γ3
wJAα1 + w
K
Aα3
where w1 = Cov[d, z] e w2 = Cov[d, (xz)], finally substituting to d its equation
we have that:
wJA = Cov[d, z] = α1Var[z] + α3Cov[z, xz]
wKA = Cov[d, xz] = α1Cov[z, xz] + α3Var[xz]
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A. Alternative specifications of the IV regression
Model with two endogenous variables
Taking as structural equation:
Y = β0 + β1D + β2X + β3XD + ,
where D and XD are instrumented with:
D = α0 + α1Z + α2X + α3XZ + υ
XD = δ0 + δ1Z + δ2X + δ3XZ + ξ.
Taking y, d, xd, z e xz that are respectively the residuals of the regression of Y ,
D, XD, Z and XZ on X, we have:
y = β1d+ β3xd+ 
d = α1z + α3xz + υ
xd = δ1z + δ3xz + ξ,
and the ITT as:
y = γ1z + γ3(xz) + ζ
the IV estimator is equal to:
(
βIV1
βIV3
)
=
[
Cov[z, d] Cov[z, (zd)]
Cov[(xz), d] Cov[(xz), (xd)]
]−1 [
Cov[z, y]
Cov[(xz), y]
]
,
taking just the first element of the vector (that is our parameter of interest) and
substituting to y, d and xd their expression, we obtain that the β1 coefficient is
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still a combination of the Jump and the Kink ratio in the form:
τ =
wJBγ1 + w
K
B γ3
wJBα1 + w
K
Bα3
,
but the weights are equal to:
wJB = {δ1Cov[z, xz] + δ3Var[xz]}Var[z]− {δ1Var[z] + δ3Cov[z, xz]}Cov[x, xz]
wKB = {δ1Cov[z, xz] + δ3Var[xz]}Cov[z, xz]− {δ1Var[z] + δ3Cov[z, xz]}Var[xz].
So the weights depend from the coefficients of the XD equation and from the
covariance matrix of z and xz.
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B. Conditional Moments of the Running Variable in the IV regression
As seen in chapter 3 the weights of the combination of the Jump and the Kink
ratios obtained with the IV regression proposed by Dong (equation (3.12)) and in
this thesis (equation (3.17)) depend on the coefficients of the first stage regressions
and on the covariance matrix of z and xz that are the residuals of the regressions
(3.13). In this appendix it is showed why that covariance matrix depends just of
some conditional and unconditional moments of the running variable. Without
loss of generality we can assume that the threshold point is x0 = 0, so Z = 1
¯{X≥=0}
and that X is bounded in an interval [−h, h]. So we have that:
Var[z] = E[z2] = E[(Z − λ0 − λ1X)2]
= E[Z2]− 2λ0E[Z]− 2λ1E[XZ] + 2λ0λ1E[X] + λ20 + λ21E[X2]
= E[Z]− 2λ0E[Z]− 2λ1E[XZ] + 2λ0λ1E[X] + λ20 + λ21E[X2]
where the first equality is due to the fact that z has zero mean and the last
because Z is a dummy variable, so it is idempotent. Now substituting to the
coefficients λ0 and λ1 their expressions:
λ1 =
Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
λ0 = E[Z]− λ1E[X] = E[Z]− Cov[X,Z]Var[X] E[X],
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we obtain:
Var[z] = E[Z]− 2E[Z]2 + Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[X]E[Z]− 2Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[XZ]
+ 2
Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[Z]E[X]− 2Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[X]2 + E[Z]2 +
Cov[X,Z]2
Var[X]2
E[X]2
− 2Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[X]E[Z] +
Cov[X,Z]2
Var[X]2
E[X2]
= E[Z]− E[Z]2 − 2Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
{E[XZ]− E[X]E[Z]}+ Cov[X,Z]
2
Var[X]2
{E[X2]− E[X]2}
= E[Z]− E[Z]2 − 2Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
Cov[X,Z] +
Cov[X,Z]2
Var[X]2
Var[X]
= E[Z]− E[Z]2 − 2Cov[X,Z]
2
Var[X]
+
Cov[X,Z]2
Var[X]
= E[Z]− E[Z]2 − Cov[X,Z]
2
Var[X]
= E[Z]− E[Z]2 − {E[XZ]− E[X]E[Z]}
2
Var[X]
.
Because Z = 1
¯{X≥=0}
, we have that:
E[Z] = 0 · Pr[X < 0] + 1 · Pr[X ≥ 0] = Pr[X ≥ 0]
E[XZ] = 0 · Pr[Z = 0] + E[X|Z = 1]Pr[Z = 1] = E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0],
so finally the expression becomes:
Var[z] = Pr[X ≥ 0]− Pr[X ≥ 0]2 − {E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− E[X]Pr[X ≥ 0]}
2
Var[X]
.
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B. Conditional Moments of the Running Variable in the IV regression
Using similar arguments the variance of xz is:
Var[xz] = E[xz2] = E[(XZ − κ0 − κ1X)2]
= E[X2Z]− 2κ0E[XZ]− 2κ1E[X2Z] + 2κ0κ1E[X] + κ20 + κ21E[X2]
= E[X2Z]− 2E[XZ]2 + 2Cov[X,XZ]
Var[X]
E[X]E[XZ]− 2Cov[X,XZ]
Var[X]
E[X2Z]
+ 2
Cov[X,XZ]
Var[X]
E[X]E[XZ]− 2Cov[X,XZ]
2
Var[X]2
E[X]2 + E[XZ]2
+
Cov[X,XZ]2
Var[X]2
E[X]2 − 2Cov[X,XZ]
Var[X]
E[X]E[XZ] +
Cov[X,XZ]2
Var[X]2
E[X2]
= E[X2Z]− E[XZ]2 − Cov[X,XZ]
2
Var[X]
= E[X2|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− {E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]}2
− {E[X
2|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− E[X]E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]}2
Var[X]
,
and the covariance between z and xz is:
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Cov[z, xz] = E[z · xz] = E[(Z − λ0 − λ1X)(XZ − κ0 − κ1X)]
= E[XZ]− κ0E[Z]− κ1E[XZ]− λ0E[XZ] + λ0κ0
+ λ0κ1E[X]− λ1E[X2Z] + λ1κ0E[X] + λ1κ1E[X2]
= E[XZ]− E[XZ]E[Z] + Cov[XZ,X]
Var[X]
E[Z]E[X]− Cov[XZ,X]
Var[X]
E[XZ]
− E[Z]E[XZ] + Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[X]E[XZ] + E[XZ]E[Z]− Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[XZ]E[X]
− Cov[XZ,X]
Var[X]
E[X]E[Z] +
Cov[X,Z]Cov[XZ,X]
Var[X]2
E[X]2
+
Cov[XZ,X]
Var[X]
E[X]E[Z]− Cov[X,Z]Cov[XZ,Z]
Var[X]2
E[X]2
− Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[X2Z] +
Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
E[XZ]E[X]− Cov[XZ,X]Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]2
E[X]2
+
Cov[X,Z]Cov[XZ,Z]
Var[X]2
E[X2]
= E[XZ]− E[XZ]E[Z]− Cov[XZ,X]Cov[X,Z]
Var[X]
= E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− E[X|X ≥ 0]{Pr[X ≥ 0]}2
− {E[X
2|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− E[X]E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]}
Var[X]
× {E[X|X ≥ 0]Pr[X ≥ 0]− E[X]Pr[X ≥ 0]}.
Note that if X is symmetric around the threshold point (e.g. X is uniformly
distributed in the interval [−h;h]), we have that:
E[X] = 0,
Pr[X ≥ 0] = 1/2
fX|X≥0(x) = 2fX(x) ∀x ∈ [0;h],
and consequently Cov[z, xz] = 0.
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